Introduction
The doctrine of supervenience has as many instances as there are set-pairs of properties or quantities.' As routinely formulated, the instances share the form: things that are exactly alike in respect of the 'base' or 'subvenient' properties (comprising one set of properties) must be alike in respect of the 'supervenient' properties (comprising a second set of properties). 2 The notion of supervenience has been employed since the 1970's in formulation of broadly materialistic doctrines-chiefly in philosophy of mind, much one of dependence (symmetrical or asymmetrical, as it might be) as it is one of identity or constitution. If this conception of the relation between micro and macro is correct, the doctrine of supervenience might be thought to express a necessary truth.
I shall then argue that supervenience as here (weakly) formulated is nonetheless too strong as an account of the relation between microproperties and macroproperties. For it proves strong enough to be subject to falsification by investigations in the domain of physical mechanics-which is to say, long before we come to the domains of psychological, epistemological or moral metaphysics. For relations between micro and macro properties are not matters of policy, to be debated independently of empirical concerns; they are, as we will see, both a posteriori and contingent.
This will suggest that we are not in a position to formulate noneliminative materialism by adding to supervenience some asymmetrizing further condition. For if the thesis that macroquantities ovary with microquantities is both empirical and contingent, then surely any other thesis of the form 'properties of type X covary with physical properties' might be empirical and contingent as well. And since materialism, at least as envisioned by its enemies, is not the sort of doctrine on whose truth empirical investigations should be in a position to shed light, it will not do to formulate materialism by means of a notion of supervenience. It shall hence become clear that, if one is after formulation of materialism, it pays to examine the dependence relations in which micro and macro properties actually stand, so as to have firmly in mind a model for the ways in which categories of properties which depend on each other are related. That is an examination into the foundations of mechanics, to which discipline the current essay aspires to contribute.
It has sometimes been declared, on the strength of the achievements of quantum theory, that we shall have to reject the doctrine of supervenience, understood as the doctrine that properties of wholes are founded on those properties of its parts which are absolute or nonrelative. And that with this doctrine shall have to be scrapped too all the familiar, common-sense metaphysics of classical physics (see for example [35] ). In examining-as we shall do here-foundations of that species of mechanical theory known as analytical mechanics, the legacy of such venerable figures as Leibniz, Euler and Lagrange, and which gave inspiration to developers of quantum physics, we shall see that such claims presuppose the falsehood that all classical physics rests on the doctrine of supervenience. We shall find that, at least in this respect, there is nothing new under the quantum sun, for the venerated analytical tradition in mechanics, based on variational principles, turned its back on supervenience more than a century and a half ago, and that the best reasons against adopting supervenience as the relationship between micro and macro are better framed by calling attention to demands that must be made on the handling of macroscopic quantities in the classical regime, than by calling attention to phenomena treated by quantum theory. 4 2. Covariation, supervenience and the strategy of this essay I shall say that a quantity Q is functionally dependent upon a class of quantities C, comprising quantities Cl,...,Cn, when for all pairs of moments t1 and t2 in time, if the magnitudes of C1,...-Cn at tj agree with those at t2, then the magnitude of Q at t1 is the same as at t2. 5 Functional dependence, as such, is neither symmetrical nor asymmetrical, for nothing in the definition rules out a state of affairs in which a quantity y is functionally dependent upon a quantity x, while at the same time x is functionally dependent upon y. And I shall say that a quantity Q varies with each of the quantities of the class C, comprising quantities C1,...,C,, when for each pair of moments t1 and t2 for which one and only one member of C takes different values, Q takes different values as well. Finally, I shall say of a pair consisting of a quantity Q and a class of quantities C, which meet both the above dependence conditions, that the former covaries with the latter.
With these logical notions in mind, we now turn to the pair of metaphysical doctrines which will hereforward occupy our attentions. The first is the thesis of determinism. This thesis is concerned with relations among states of the entire universe taken in temporal sequence. It is the proposition that once all the quantities of the universe have taken on magnitude at a time to, the magnitudes of those quantities are uniquely prearranged or preestablished for all subsequent times. (This is sometimes expressed, in terms of possible worlds, as follows: any two possible worlds which agree as to all their facts at a certain time to will agree as to all their facts from that time forward.) But determinism confers neither a privilege nor a distinction on any particular subset of the set of quantities, since it does not even subdivide the members of the class of quantities in any suggestive way-for instance, as to which are more or less prior, in some sense of 'prior'. What kind of dependence thesis is put forward in the doctrine of determinism? Merely functional dependence. 6 The doctrine of supervenience, by contrast, aspires to make discriminations among quantities, but fails to do so when formulated (as has been done by others) in terms of logical dependence relations such as those of functional dependence and covariation. Since I shall be concerned to show that even the 4 As is well known, quantum theory is in this respect continuous with classical analytical mechanics: the former is patterned after the Hamilton-Jacobi equations. Thus the apparent aberrations of quantum theory may themselves be subject to explanation in terms of principles and categories present in analytical mechanics. 5 This idea is formulated also by Grelling [9] . 6 Earman [6] understands determinism as the doctrine that assignment of magnitudes to physical quantities at a given moment yields assignment of magnitudes to those quantities for all time. His formulation therefore requires two-fold functional dependence, one for each direction of dependence. covariational formulations of supervenience are too strong, I will not here attempt to improve on the formulations of supervenience, so as to capture the intended, asymmetrical notion. Thus I shall understand the term 'supervenience' as follows: once quantities in category A have taken on magnitude at a given moment in time, absolutely all quantities in categories A and B are invested with magnitude for that time; this formulation is intended to capture the (rather imprecise) idea that there is no "freedom" in choosing magnitudes for quantities in category B, once the magnitudes of those in category A have been chosen. And I shall focus in particular on the instance of this doctrine in which category A comprises microscopic quantities, and category B comprises nonmicroscopic but nonetheless physical quantities. In this essay, therefore, 'supervenience' shall denote the doctrine that once all microscopic quantities have taken on magnitude at a given moment in time, absolutely all physical quantities are invested with magnitude for that time. The term thus designates an instantaneous functional dependence relation among physical quantities, which is possibly also a covariational relation, from either of which it follows that magnitudes of nonmicroscopic physical quantities, at a given moment in time, are instantaneous functions of magnitudes of microquantities.
Supervenience, as here defined, is presupposed by the idea that names for macroquantities are just names for certain arrangements of microquantities, which receives (partial) expression in the doctrine that dispositions, like solubility and rigidity, are identical with the intrinsic "causes" ("in the object") of their manifestations, which are exhibited in interactions with an environment. Quine, for example, writes:7 Each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism. A name for a specific disposition, e.g. solubility in water, deserves its place in the vocabulary of scientific theory as a name of a particular state or mechanism. In some cases, as in the case nowadays of solubility in water, we understand the physical details and are able to set them forth explicitly in terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. Such a formulation, once achieved, can thenceforward even take the place of the old disposition term, or stand as its new definition. [31, 11] I will begin by arguing that doctrines of this nature fail to divide between (on the one hand) questions about magnitudes of quantities and their relations to same-time magnitudes of microquantities, and (on the other hand) the systematic alterations over time in these magnitudes, as the bodies to which they adhere obey mechanical law. And so doctrines like Quine's miss the very interesting relations entered into by macroquantities (on the one hand) and mechanical laws (on the other). These relations, however, form an indispensable part of the story concerning the relations between micro and macro.
Speaking from the standpoint of logic, the distinct theses of determinism and supervenience are, each one, compatible with and independent of the other. The two are nonetheless combined in the very strong claim made by some admirers of physical science-and only they know who they are these days-that once microscopic quantities have taken on magnitude at a given moment in time, the magnitudes of all quantities are uniquely established for all time. I shall refer to this strong thesis as reductionism.8 Each of the two doctrines, supervenience and determinism, is concerned with a dimension of the question: what are the true degrees of freedom in the universe? Supervenience attempts to capture-insofar as a covariation thesis is able-the notion that the only true degrees of freedom are microscopic in character. I shall say that determinism attempts to capture-insofar as a covariation thesis is able-the notion that the only degrees of freedom are "initial". By this I shall not mean that determinism entails there is a single, first, moment in the history of the universe at which time the magnitudes of quantities are not each constrained to a unique magnitude; I shall mean only that determinism is committed to there being at most one moment at which physical quantities are not all so constrained. Reductionism, then (to complete the parallel characterization), attempts to capture the notion that the only degrees of freedom in the universe are both initial and microscopic. Now supervenience is nothing more than atomism with respect to quantities, as it declares that there is no "global" property of a system that cannot be decomposed into a constellation of "local" characteristics. When supervenience is embraced only as a first strategy of analysis, there is no fault to be found with it. Strategies of analysis which break the whole into parts and their interrelations are to be commended for their tendencies to produce simpler and more widely applicable theories; for such is the very stuff of analysis. But analysis does not perish if supervenience (as the universal doctrine here defined) is dealt a deadly blow, any more than it perishes with, say, some (very silly) covariation doctrine, for example to the effect that once the dimensions of a designated tree have taken on magnitude, the dimensions of absolutely all trees are invested with magnitude-which, if true (as I trust it is not), is true only contingently. In this essay I shall focus attention on supervenience as a universal doctrine about macroquantities, not as a research strategy. And I shall provisionally take an atomistic view of physical bodies: a physical body, I hereby stipulate, is nothing more than an aggregation of x The term 'reductionism' is customarily used in connection with the topic of derivability among theories. But no entailment relations may hold unless the ontological relation here denoted 'reductionism' also holds. So the doctrine of reductionism as formulated here is no stronger (and is perhaps weaker) than the doctrine that concerns theory reduction, just as my 'supervenience' is weaker than the intended sense. Thus the claim in Kim [15] , that supervenience implies theory reducibility, is most likely too strong: it is better to say that supervenience provides the potential for derivability, should other conditions also prevail.
basic building blocks of matter, whatever these latter shall turn out to be. This stipulation does not, as we will see, decide the matter of supervenience as a universal doctrine; for supervenience is concerned with the relations among quantities, not relations of part and whole among physical bodies. My strategy in this essay shall be to examine the relation in mechanics of the pair of doctrines: supervenience and determinism. This relation, as will be revealed, is tremendously significant. For it is possible to formulate classical mechanics in such a way as to take advantage of the existence, in such formulations, of mathematical devices that represent the advance of time-and which are such as to inspire confidence in the truth of determinism-in order to prevent violation of supervenience. It is also possible to formulate classical mechanics-and to do so in an observationally equivalent, and thus equally empirically respectable, way-such that violations of supervenience are (on the one hand) routine, and (on the other hand) necessary for achieving complete descriptions of the motions of mechanical systems-necessary, therefore, for achieving a deterministic mechanical theory. The need to be able to treat certain macro quantities in mechanics shall, ultimately, put us in the enviable position of choosing between two well-regarded formulations of mechanics, only one of which preserves supervenience universally. The two formulations conceive of mechanical law in quite different ways. Each lies in a respected branch of mechanical theory. And the basic equations of each formulation are known to be interderivable, the one set from the other. (These realities, incidentally, are conclusive evidence that a theory is not merely a set of equations.) If, on the one hand, we elect the historically first-the Newtonian-formulation of mechanics, we take advantage of determinism in the interests of preserving supervenience. But if, on the other hand, we elect the second-the analytical-formulation, we sacrifice supervenience, and by so doing contribute to preserving determinism. Thus, while the distinction between the two doctrines may be sharp, logically and ontologically speaking, the choice in favor of a mechanical theory preserving supervenience cannot, in practice, be made independently of the choice of how to secure determinism. Treatment of the macro cannot be separated from treatment of mechanical law, for there are trade-offs to be made between them.
The basics
Logically speaking, there are two phases in the treatment of a system falling within the compass of classical mechanics-phases which in practice are not separated in time. In the first phase, the investigator enumerates (i) the entities that compose the system to be treated and (ii) the complete set of quantities that belong to these entities and to the composite which they form. On any given occasion, a tabulation of these items is child's play. For this first phase of analysis is, in an important sense, "mechanical" (pun intended); once each item on the list of quantities receives a magnitude assignment, at the selected time, there is no question that the state of the system, at that time, has been described exhaustively.
In the second, and far less "mechanical," phase of treatment, the investigator must separate the independent quantities from the dependent ones. The independent quantities are designated degrees offreedom. Their number must be distinguished from the number of epistemically possible degrees of freedom (degrees of freedom, for all we know at the first phase), the latter being equal to the number of quantities on the complete list. By conclusion of the second phase, the investigator has offered a proposal for the actual degrees of freedom in the systems being treated. The second phase is really, therefore, among the stages of theory formulation. The complexity of the process of selecting from among competing representation schemes of dependent and independent quantities is very much underappreciated. And the commendation due to a theory ultimately put forward depends on both (1) the extent to which that theory has correctly determined the number of degrees of freedom and (2) the extent to which it has correctly identified them.
It pays at this stage to get clear on the concept of degree of freedom. Supervenience as here understood is a logical species of dependence relation, and is therefore a relation that can be entered into by mathematical objects such as variables, which are the normal entities used to represent quantities in a physical theory. There is another species of dependence relation which physical quantities may enter into, but which variables cannot, since variables are abstract and not concrete entities. I shall call it physical dependence. The correlative, and more basic, notion is that of physical independence: it is in fact the notion of degree offreedom.
The idea is this: X is a physically independent quantity whenever it is among those quantities whose magnitudes shape the state of a system to which they belong, and it is physically dependent when it is given shape to by other quantities. For example, momentum shapes kinetic energy, whereas kinetic energy does not shape momentum. The concept of shaping is primitive in our treatment, and is governed by the following axioms, which entail that shaping is an unmediated and irreflexive activity.
A I When quantity X shapes the state of a system a, it is false that X is given shape to by any other quantity.
A II When quantity Y of a system a is given shape to by a quantity X, it is false that X is given shape to by any other quantity.
In the physical sciences the concept of independent quantity, which is a variant on the concept of degree of freedom, is formulated typically in the epistemological mode: X is an independent quantity whenever X is among quantities whose magnitudes must be specified in order to specify completely the state of the system to which they belong.9 A formulation of this conception indirectly, in the epistemological mode, will not do, since such a formulation cannot distinguish between (for example) physical and functional dependence, and since also it might inadvertently lead to error, or (worse) confound two dependence relations, as what may serve for complete specification of a system may not necessarily coincide with what gives shape to that system. I shall therefore adopt the following definition of degree offreedom: Def X is a physically independent quantity or a degree of freedom (or, alternatively, one of the freedoms) of a system a =df X is among those quantities whose magnitudes shape the state of (.
With this notion we extract the notion of physical dependence as follows:
Def X is a physically dependent quantity of a system a =df X is not among those quantities whose magnitudes shape the state of (. Different mechanical theories may assign the roles of degrees of freedom to different physical quantities. So I shall say that Def X is a physically independent quantity or degree of freedom of a system a according to a theory or scheme of representation T =df X is designated by T to be among those quantities whose magnitudes shape the state of (. It shall, therefore, be sensible to pose the question: which (if any) of competing theories or schemes is correct in its designation of the degrees of freedom? It shall also be sensible to pose the question: is there a unique set of degrees of freedom for every system?"'' 9 In the Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Physics [36, p. 818]-one of the very few places in physical literature where there is any attempt to give instruction on usage of the term independent quantity-M. McGlashan defines independent variable as follows: "In a thermodynamic system at equilibrium F=C+2-P, intensive variables (such as temperature, pressure, densities of the phases) must be specified in order completely to define the state of the system, where C is the number of independent components and P is the number of phases." Here the term 'independent quantity' never even appears, only the term 'independent component'. The term 'degree of freedom,' in comparison, receives the following definition: "The number of degrees of freedom of any mechanical system is the minimum number of coordinates required to specify the motion of that system." [36, p. 
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Clearly the notion of physical dependence just defined does not coincide with the notion of functional dependence. For one thing, the former is not even a relation among quantities, but a property which is exhibited by individual quantities single-handedly. However, there is a closely allied relation-which we may call physical foundation-into which physical quantities enter, which may itself be defined in terms of the property of being a degree of freedom. In this brief note I shall give only necessary conditions for this relation of foundation: If Y is physically founded upon X in a then: (1) X and Y both belong to cy, and (2) X is a degree of freedom of s but Y is not. (The converse of this conditional is The claim that designation of the degrees of freedom of a system cannot be unique is stressed in standard textbooks on classical mechanics. J. Marion [25, [200] [201] introduces the notion of independence as follows:
We shall consider a general mechanical system which consists of a collection of n discrete, point particles, some of which may be connected together to form rigid bodies. In order to specify the state of such a system at a given time, it is necessary to use n radius vectors. Since each radius vector consists of a triple of numbers (e.g., the rectangular coordinates), 3n quantities must be specified in order to describe the positions of all the particles. If there exist equations of constraint which relate some of these coordinates to others..., then not all of the 3n coordinates are independent. In fact, if there are m equations of constraint, then 3n-m coordinates are independent, and the system is said to possess 3n-m degrees offreedom.11
But how are the coordinates chosen? Marion continues:
The ultimate test of the "suitability" of a particular set of generalized coordinates is whether the resulting equations of motion are sufficiently simple to allow a straight-forward interpretation. Unfortunately, no general rules can be stated for the selection of the "most suitable" set of generalized coordinates for a given problem; a certain skill must be developed through experience.
But why can no rules be stated? According to the New Dictionary of Physics, this is due to the fact that the "generalized coordinates may be chosen in more than one way" [emphasis added]. How so? If we wish to specify displacement of the center of a billiard ball from a certain reference point, within a closed room, we can do it in (much) more than one way. We can, for example, specify rectangular coordinates of a vector with tail anchored to coordinates of the reference point; rectangular coordinates will be vertical distances of the center of the ball from planes which intersect at right angles at the reference point. We will, of course, require three coordinates to make the specification in a 3-dimensional room. Or, alternatively, we can designate the center of the floor as reference point and one ray lying in the floor and emanating from that point as direction of reference, then specify two angles (an azimuthal angle, and a vertical angle) and a distance from the center of the floor. And there are as many schemes of specifying displacement as we might wish. Specification of all six coordinates mentioned above will reveal that (at least) three of them will be excessive, because (at least) three will always covary with the others. And if the object whose coordinates we wish to specfalse, since when X is a degree of freedom but Y is not, it does not follow that Y is founded on X, for it might be that Y is founded on some third quantity which gives it shape, and is not given shape to by X at all. Hence we have not presented sufficient conditions for physical foundation.) It follows from this necessary condition that physical foundation is an asymmetrical relation, for whenever Y is physically founded on X, it shall be false that X is physically founded on Y. It also follows that physical foundation is irreflexive and immediate, since shaping is both. Cf. V. I. Arnold [ ify is constrained to remain on a particular surface, say a model train track, then we will recognize that even three coordinates is excessive, and we can make do with fewer yet (for instance, merely distance along the track from a certain point will pinpoint the caboose). The smallest number of coordinates required to specify the location of an object is that object's number of (spatial) degrees of freedom,
In the laboratory, a quantity is considered a candidate for being an actual degree of freedom for a system if that system lends itself to preparation by laboratory personnel in a variety of magnitudes. Additionally, the number of actual degrees of freedom for a system is defined as the total number of quantities that may, all at once, be adjusted ad libitum. While laboratory determinations of the number of quantities that may be adjusted simultaneously will assist with determining the number of degrees of freedom in a nominated set of candidates, it cannot assist in separating the dependent from the independent. Independence is not, therefore, directly observable.
One may wonder at this stage whether it makes sense at all to inquire of a system with N degrees of freedom, which of its quantities are its degrees of freedom. Supervenience enthusiasts, of course, are most emphatically on the side of this question's making excellent sense, and they will insist that it takes only a simple example to establish that certain quantities could not serve as degrees of freedom. A particle in motion (to give such an example) has both momentum, which is directly proportional to speed, and kinetic energy. At most one degree of freedom will be shared between these two quantities. One calculates the particle's kinetic energy by multiplying the momentum by itself, then dividing the result by the mass. Conversely, one can calculate the momentum by multiplying the kinetic energy by the mass, then taking the square root of the result. But, as supervenience fans will no doubt insist, the fact remains that we shall believe that momentum (speed) is more "basic" or "fundamental" than energy, and that this relationship between momentum and energy is absolute; hence, one cannot alter the speed of this particle by tampering with its kinetic energy, but instead, one must be resigned to altering the kinetic energy by altering the speed. For it is the momentum which shapes the kinetic energy, and not the reverse. Thus we will be asked to acknowledge that there is an answer to this-very sensiblequestion. But what grounds-apart from such anecdotal material as has just been rehearsed-can be called upon to justify an answer to the question: which are the degrees of freedom of a physical system? This question is at the heart of the matters we take up in this essay.
The actual number of degrees of freedom is normally thought to be made strictly smaller than the number of theoretically possible degrees by two kinds of realities: (1) regularities-called mechanical or dynamical laws-that mark inviolable relations over time among quantities; and (2) the fact that a selected quantity may be represented by time-independent equations involving other quantities (i.e. equations involving simultaneous magnitudes). One school of thought-which comprises the friends of supervenience, among others-favors explaining reductions in degrees of freedom brought about in the second way in terms of certain necessary ontological facts-facts concerning asymmetrical dependence (thought of in terms of supervenience relations) of certain quantities upon others; while reductions in degrees of freedom brought about in the first way will be explained as the result of mechanical laws of nature. But are these two modes of reduction mutually exclusive, and therefore subject to different explanations, the one via mechanical law and the other via supervenience? No.
Quantities, states and policies
In classical mechanics, the term generalized coordinates refers to a set of variables representing a particular set of quantities; I will refer to them as generalized quantities. The most abstract mathematical structure for representing the condition of a classical system is a multi-dimensional phase space, with each dimension of that space standing for a range of theoretically possible magnitudes of a generalized quantity. Each dimension of phase space therefore designates a potential degree of freedom in a classical system-an epistemic potential for independent variations over time. (Phase space is not to be equated with the familiar three-dimensional space in which objects move.)
On a standard atomistic model of physical bodies, a mechanical system is a collection of n discrete particles, each customarily treated as if it occupies only a single spatial point at any one time."2 It is stipulated that each of these particles has two sets of quantities, a set that concerns its whereabouts in spatial extension, and another set that concerns its quantity of motion-its momentum-in each spatial extension. Thus 6 quantities in all to a body.
Three foundational questions must be answered before the question of how mechanical systems change over time can be treated:
1. How shall the state or condition of a physical system be portrayed? 2. How shall those aspects of the state or condition, which are subject to changing over time, be portrayed, in relation to those conditions which are not subject to changing over time?
3. How shall relations between micro and macro properties of a physical system be handled?
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I am, obviously, confining attentions to noncontinuum classical theories, for the sake of the argument. However, everything I shall say carries over, without loss, to continuum treatments.
Mechanics replies to the first of these with: a system shall be portrayed by the condition of its quantities.'3 The alternatives, of course, are legion, and prominently include an Aristotelian substance-accident analysis. But the mechanics of our day collapses the objects of natural science into collections (heaps) of quantities, leaving systematic reconstitution of objects from quantities to other disciplines.14 To the second question, the customary reply given by practitioners of mechanics since Newton is: By a zero-dimensional point (or if a portrait over time is desired, by a sequence of such points-a trajectory or orbit, which is a one-dimensional entity) in a phase space in which a certain number of microquantities of the system, of those subject to changing over time, are represented on independent axes. We shall give attention to the relation in which this customary reply stands to those which may be given to the third question. A respectable reply to the third question will depend in part on the reply offered to the second question (as one would expect), and in part on decisions concerning how to portray mechanical laws. When mechanical laws are understood according to the mechanical tradition in which Lagrange and Hamilton stand, the customary answer to the second question becomes untenable.
Customary presumptions aboutfreedoms
The customary presumption, according to which a physical system is portrayed by a one-dimensional point in a phase space in which a certain number of microquantities are represented on independent axes, favors looking on each of the 6 (micro)quantities named above as degrees of freedom in the body to which they belong; for normally each of these microquantities, when treated explicitly, is treated as deserving of representation on an axis orthogonal to all the others. And the customary understanding is that quantities receiving representation on axes orthogonal to each other are candidates for actual degrees of freedom. It follows from this that each of a body' s constituents has a maximum of 6 degrees of freedom, with the maximum being attained only when no conditions exist that limit that constituent's set of freedoms.15 13 This holds even in quantum mechanics, although 'condition of quantities,' rather than understood simply as a set of magnitude taken on by those quantities, is understood instead as a set of (nonclassical) probability assignments from magnitude ranges to real numbers in the interval [0,1]. 14 B. Smith [34] suggests a direction one might go in reconstituting the objects by binding the quantities together.
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One further assumption is also customarily made. It is further assumed that, since the maximum number of degrees of freedom for each of a body's constituents is 6, the number of degrees of freedom of the composite with n constituents cannot exceed 6n. There is something of supervenience in this customary assumption too; for by what principle of reasoning shall we rule out, in analysis of composite bodies, a geometrical, exponential or irregular growth in number of degrees of freedom with the multiplication of bodies, favoring instead a linear growth-except by bias in favor of supervenience? (You might say it is, rather, bias in favor of simplicity; but it comes to the same thing.)
In addition to microquantities we normally also have cause to treat macroquantities. But where, in the order of quantities, will we say that macroquantities belong? Shall we say that they belong to the dependent category of quantity, or to the independent category? If we say that macroquantities always belong among the dependent quantities, then we may proceed with portraying systems by points ( Treatment of macroproperties as special modes of constraint, distinct from mechanical law, has the advantage of being universally applicable, as we will see when we look at a specific example: any macroproperty, even if not treatable as an instantaneous function of microcoordinates, may be treated as a constraint upon the system-a time relation in which stand certain groups of microcoordinates. These quantities may therefore be represented by sets of equations relating magnitudes of microcoordinates over the span of time for which a description of the system is undertaken. This treatment of quantities of the second kind is, apparently, quite in the spirit of the doctrine of supervenience. For even if we adopt this treatment of quantities of the second kind, we can still conceive of ourselves as adhering to the proposition that macroquantities covary with microquantities, though perhaps not with simultaneous magnitudes of microquantities. However, since supervenience is officially defined here as instantaneous covariation between micro and macro, we violate the letter of this doctrine when we acknowledge the existence of macroquantities of the second kind. But of course true friends of supervenience of macro on micro need not be so strict on themselves as we are being here. Their concern is not that macromagnitudes at a time t shall be determined by micromagnitudes at that time; their concern is simply that macromagnitudes shall be inviolably covariant with micromagnitudes. In other words, they wish to adhere simply to the proposal that the macromagnitudes are established once the micromagnitudes for each moment in time are established. True: center of mass and macromomentum are simple instantaneous functions of microcoordinates, whereas quantities like rigidity are relations among microcoordinates over time. But since both types may be treated as covariations of some kind, what harm is done to the spirit of the thing in recognizing both types of macroquantities as supervenient upon the appropriate microquantity base? I shall argue that the difference in treatment we must give the macroquantities falling under the two categories makes all the difference in the world. For it is the difference between simply stipulating that all and only independent quantities shall be represented on orthogonal axes (where typically only microcoordinates receive representation) on the one hand, and disdaining such stipulations on the other. It is ultimately the difference between recognizing a potential for certain macroquantities (of the second kind) to serve as degrees of freedom, on the one hand, and condemning all macroquantities, always and everywhere, to a dependent existence, on the other. and released all at once in a uniform gravitational field, with 4i=O initially for all i. Then the particles will execute free fall. What will transpire when the first particle encounters an impenetrable surface S? This depends on the nature of the interparticle relations. If the particles comprise a perfectly rigid body, and the quantities of motion involved are not too great, the transactions of this assembly with other bodies will be elastic: the ring will be reflected from the surface, retaining its original shape at all times. This is not true if the assembly is only imperfectly rigid; in that case, the body will undergo deformation, while if the relations among the body's components are purely juxtapositional, encounter with another body will scatter the components, and the figure will deserve to be called a body only in the most strained sense of that term. Rigidity is defined in standard textbooks in terms of reductions from a maximum of 6n degrees of freedom via restriction of the physical system to motions representable in a phase space smaller in number of dimensions than the original 6n. ' At the same time, the system is itself portrayed by a single trajectory on the hypersurface delimited by the constraints."8 The idea, then, is that rigidity is conformity to certain restrictions, and that this conformity is revealed in the actual behavior of the rigid body. The deficiency in this idea is as follows: a system satisfying the restrictions may nevertheless fail to be rigid. An assembly like that depicted in Figure 1 , existing in a universe in which there is neither a surface S nor any other entities (apart from the n particles that compose the assembly), nor any nonuniformity of any kind (save the assembly itself, if it may be considered a nonuniformity) will exhibit uniform motion in conformity with (a) and (b). But this motion-and the trajectory associated with it-will arise whether the assembly is rigid or not. Thus satisfaction of restriction to certain phase space regions is not a sufficient condition for rigidity. No single orbit satisfying certain restrictions, and describing alterations in any single uninterrupted time sequence extended indefinitely into both past and future, exhaustively captures the information contained in a statement to the effect certain particles compose a rigid body.'9 Rigidity, therefore, is not a function of actual microquantities, let alone an instantaneous function of them. For the rigidity of the assembly in Figure 1 does not 17 Arnold [1, 133] does not add this restriction, but since my complaint will be that the conjunction of (a) and (b) is not sufficient for rigidity, I am only improving matters for friends of the standard model by adding (b). 18 There exists a kind of four-dimensionalism in mechanics: systems are not extended simply in space, but in spacetime. 19 My argument thus far has been that the standard analysis of rigidity in mechanics does not furnish a sufficient condition. There have been charges made that facsimiles of this standard analysis do not even capture a necessary condition, since rigid bodies may experience breakages and other disfigurements, without losing the attribute of rigidity. Certain repairs of the standard analysis have been suggested to treat these shortcomings, a prominent one being that the subvenient or "base" reality must be extended to include (1) properties of the environment in which the putatively rigid body is embedded and possibly also (2) the conditions to which the body is subjected, whether these conditions can be said to originate with any other body in the environment or not. (See, for example, Smith [33] . Prior [30] , by contrast, claims to solve the problem by treating dispositional properties as incomplete predicates; however that solution cannot be considered a preservation of supervenience.) The proposal is to save covariation of macro with micro by weakening it-with enlargement of the supervenience base to include characteristics or conditions pertaining to environment. We shall consider a proposal of this type in connection with the problems we are considering. consist in the fact that the actual behavior of its constituents over time is in conformity with restrictions (a) and (b).2(' So, whether As noted, the conventional portrait of a physical system in modern mechanics is a single (the actual) trajectory in a phase space in which microcoordinates are represented on orthogonal axes; the conventional portrait is thus a one-dimensional mathematical object. At the same time, the standard portrait of rigidity is a hypersurface in that space-the submanifold, typically multi-dimensional, delimited by certain formally-expressible constraints. When these two portrayals come together, as they do in canonical textbooks like those of Arnold and Marion, the resulting picture of things suffers the following-additional-deficiency. Since the body is portrayed by a onedimensional geometrical entity-a trajectory or line-but rigidity (alleged to be a characteristic of that body) is portrayed by a multidimensional entity (furthermore, with the number of dimensions of that entity not in any way tied to properties of the portrait of the body to which the property is alleged to belong), the portrait of the body does not, and could not conceivably, include the mathematical portrait of the property; the portrait of the property is not joined or intertwined in any way with the portrait of the entity to which the property is said to belong. This defect-a grave one from ontological and representational perspectives-gives rise to difficulties also for epistemology. For if we embrace the proposal to represent rigidity by means of mathematical entities that are independent of those by which we represent the body to which the rigidity belongs, it shall be difficult to put forward a satisfying theoretical account of how, epistemologically, we might have access to that characteristic merely by interacting with that body, in the absence of knowledge of mechanical laws. But we are without question possessed of such access. If the standard portrait of body were literally accurate, then the only conditions of a body that could be accessed are the magnitudes of microquantities and, through these, magnitudes of macroquantities of the first kind. But then an observer could not be in a position to determine the rigidity of a given body, at any given time, unless she has knowledge of mechanical laws-and possibly not even then. And yet in practice, determinations of rigidity often comes simply through the making of measurements, and does not require calculations that take notice of mechanical law: a variety of stress tests, or comparisons with a "standard" of perfect rigidity, does the job very nicely. Now perhaps all of these facts may be reconciled, but the means of their conciliation is by no means either terribly clear or terribly desirable.
It is worth, therefore, investigating alternative means of portraying physical systems that accommodate both micro and macro characteristics but do not, above all, pose these ontological and epistemological difficulties, and inquiring whether an alternative portrayal will serve the purposes of a science of mechanics. The problem we have identified does not consist in the fact that there is poor portrayal of macroquantities; rather it consists in a mismatch of portrayals. And this mismatch results from the assumption of supervenience.
Few theoretitians have explicitly considered alternatives to this standard combination of portrayals, let alone championed a nonstandard one. 21 The nonstandard alternative I shall be urging retains portrayal of macroquantities like rigidity by means of hypersurfaces, but represents the entity to which rigidity belongs by means of a multi-dimensional collection of trajectories on that hypersurface, which join together in comprising the hypersurface: I shall call it the Neohamiltonian portrait.22 It corrects the mismatch, insuring that the portrait of the macroquantity is part of the portrait of the system. But the Neohamiltonian portrait does not preserve supervenience. And this, as I shall argue, is to its credit.
Two conceptions of dynamical law
The Neohamiltonian portrait of a system includes all potential trajectories not prohibited by (so-called "macroscopic") constraints. According to the Neohamiltonian account of systems, these too-no less than the actual trajectory-are aspects of the body-in-itself.
Display of potential trajectories are part of what it takes-possibly even part of what it means-to represent the macroproperty. For while it is clear that a good mechanical theory should draw attention to the actual trajectory by which microquantities evolve as the actual trajectory, it is a different and entirely independent question whether, in portrayal of the system, that trajectory should receive the preferential treatment it routinely does.
The Neohamiltonian portrait accommodates (by design) the fact that, through interaction with a system via measurement of its macroquantities, we gain information about its alternative orbits in microcoordinate phase space; for the portrait recognizes magnitudes of certain macroquantities are constitutive of facts about a system's alternative trajectories. Not surprisingly, this conception of system marks a significant departure from the standard conception, on which multiple trajectories are considered to harbor more information than strictly necessary to achieve complete portrayal of a mechanical system. I shall show that it departs from the standard conception also in the respect that it presents a possibility for macroquantities to function as degrees of freedom, for it presents a possibility for portraying macroquantities as shaping the states of systems to which they belong. 21 The exceptions are N. Krylov [20] and the followers of I. Prigogine [25] , [26] , [27] , [29] , physicists at odds with the mainstream. See also the criticisms of these views: Batterman [2] , [3] . 22 The conception of system as collection of trajectories has some affinities, though it is not identical, with the conception of system as a multidimensional region in phase space. A region may be easily defined as a union of trajectories, but a collection of trajectories is not so easily defined in terms of regions. (But I am told that it has been done via descending chains of regions by Tarski and Whitehead.) Each portrait (single-trajectory and multiple-trajectory) requires appropriate handling by the mathematical device representing time development within a mechanical theory. I will consider, for each one, a proposal to yoke it to a mechanical theory. The first proposal shall preserve portrayal of systems by single trajectories, through adding appendages to the latter. It shall, consequently, preserve supervenience by weakening it-that is, by enlarging the supervenience base. This proposal may be recognized as the Newtonian formulation of mechanics. The second proposal, which I shall designate the Neohamiltonian formulation because it is implicit in the analytical treatment conceived by Lagrange and Hamilton, does not preserve supervenience. Both depictions can accommodate the fact that, when we are informed of a body's degree of rigidity, we learn something not only about its actual behavior but also about its behavior had its circumstances been different, so correcting the mismatch in the conventional combination of portrayals.
. Alteration as the transmission of influence
The first proposal-the Newtonian treatment-results from natural modification of the conventional portrait in mechanics. Motion-the explanandum in mechanics-is by its very nature a directed phenomenon. A natural description of motion introduces vectorial quantities (such as directed rate of motion), and vectorial variables to portray them. The Newtonian treatment of motion takes vectorial analysis of motion one step further, for with each alteration in motion it postulates an entity-an agent, routinely interpreted as a cause-that brings about alteration by communicating an influence in the appropriate direction. Like ordinary bodies, the agents through which influence is communicated are, on a Newtonian model, both located and propagated along continuous spatio-temporal paths.23 Distinguishing marks of the Newtonian treatment are as follows.
First there is influence, which is propagated from a source to a
beneficiary, via an intermediary. For physical body, on the Newtonian conception of mechanics, does not act on physical body directly, but through an agent. The agent is thought of as originating from the source body, which is responsible, ontologically rather than causally, for the agent's existence. The agent, known as a force, is represented by a vectorial variable. One body acts on another, not directly, but by impressing a force. Forces, the theory goes, are the entities that bring about alterations in both nonvectorial quantities and certain other vectorial quantities. 23 Relativity repairs certain deficiencies of Newtonian physics: it requires that influence cannot be transmitted instantaneously, but must take time to travel intervening distances between source and recipient.
Then there are recipients of influence-quantities whose magnitudes change according to the operation of force, taking on different magnitudes in succession. Alterations in magnitude in these quantities are thought of as being brought about in a continuous fashion over time, by the incremental operation of force, according to Newton's Second Law.
3. Not all alternative courses of values-trajectories-for a particular quantity receive attention or representation. In fact, there is only one course of values ever explicitly discussed for a system-the actual one.
Restrictions (a) and (b) above, ostensibly depicting the characteristic of rigidity, are interpreted as expressing the reality that whatever motions would come to pass shall be altered as necessary to preserve the shape of the body in question. Since on the Newtonian treatment alterations in certain microquantities are manifestations of the action of forces, the requirement to match alterations to forces shall demand that, alongside confinement conditions like (a) and (b), an analysis be given of those forces that bring these restrictions about. Thus the Newtonian, needing to identify devices of alteration in physical systems, needs to supplement the conventional single-trajectory portrait with forces that act on the system to bring about alteration. These forces, in conjunction with Newton's laws of motion, yield the conventional trajectory. But forces, as partisans of a single-trajectory conception of system will quickly recognize, are respectable surrogates for rigidity. In a rigid body, the Newtonian will say, there are a great many interparticle forces. These are the (forward-looking) devices which act to preserve a collective in a designated shape. And these forces are also the reality with which we are in touch in the laboratory. (Forces, the Newtonian will say, are those entities which support modal characteristics like rigidity.) Thus once forces are suitably studied, and their representations added as appendages to the original single-trajectory portrait, we shall have no need to draw attention to alternative trajectories in order to portray a system in all its macro glory.
The Newtonian treatment of macrocharacteristics like rigidity proceeds, then, by taking notice of the putative forces by which alterations to motion are said to be brought about. The Newtonian continues to portray the system by means of a single trajectory, to which are appended force vectors, and identifies rigidity with those special forces responsible for bringing about alterations to motion in such a way as to maintain the confinement conditions (a) and (b). By exhibiting these modified trajectories, enthusiasts of Newtonian mechanics meet both ontological and epistemological challenges squarely: rigidity is represented by a battery of force vectors, and these are "local" characteristics of single but modified trajectories-the magnitudes of fields defined at each point of a trajectory.
Alteration without transmissions
The proposal I shall favor for yoking a multiple-trajectory portrait of system to mechanical theory utilizes the dynamics of that second ( An analytical treatment is extraordinarily useful when the mechanical problem is not yielding to analysis of forces-which is unremarkably often. And it is magnificently unconcerned with agents of variation. Alteration is explained, in other words, without pleadings of influence communication.
Adoption of the Neohamiltonian portrait is a natural preliminary to adoption of analytical dynamics, since a multiple-trajectory portrait is readymade for application of variational principles. In analytical mechanics the set of possible trajectories is in place before application of a variational principle that selects among them a distinguished one. The possible trajectories, taken together, typically form a hypersurface.
Practitioners of analytical mechanics are sometimes disposed to say that agents of influence are "smuggled in" via boundary conditions; but this is a mistake on their parts-and one that serves to mask the conceptual gulf between analytical and Newtonian formulations. For according to the theory of analytical mechanics, boundary conditions and variational principles serve cooperatively to reduce the number of degrees of freedom in the systems being treated. This multilaterality of action cannot be further from the conception of alterations which is favored by the devout Newtonian, on whose account there is unilateral reduction in degrees of freedom, via forces. These two treatments are observationally equivalent: the Neohamiltonian and Newtonian treatments distinguish exactly the same single trajectory as the actual one. Furthermore it is (at least formally) possible to pass freely between the two treatments, using Newton's Second Law either to extract (resultant) forces from trajectories, or to calculate trajectories from the combination of forces and initial conditions.27 Thus two esteemed physical theories-both quite comprehensive, and routinely treated as complementary in textbooks-disagree on which quantities to designate as dependent and which as degrees of freedom, even when they treat all the same quantitiesalthough there is exact agreement between them concerning what observation shall yield in those domains for which the theories are designed. Since there is disagreement between these two different treatments on such important physical questions such as 'Which are a system's degrees of freedom?' it follows that these two treatment are in competition with one another, and not complimentary.
An equivalence thesis of sorts

Disagreements
The Newtonian treatment preserves supervenience by weakening it-through broadening of the supervenience base to such things as forces. On an analytical treatment, by contrast, the actual trajectory emerges, according to Hamilton's Principle, as a result of there being a unique potential trajectory meeting all boundary conditions, which is possessed of an extremum (typically a minimum) in the difference between potential and kinetic energies. Without prior specification of the boundary conditions, not only is the system to be treated underdescribed, but also the mechanical problem itself is underspecified. For the dynamical laws-the variational principles-of the analyt- 26 Forces, according to the Newtonian model, are not themselves independent quantities, but functions of independent quantities like mass and charge. ical treatment are in their essence contrastive: they select that trajectory which possesses an extremum of a particular characteristic, while presupposing that the set of alternative trajectories has an independent specification. This is why certain macroconditions and constraints on motion must be known prior to computation of the system's path through phase space, for not only do the macroconditions and constraints help to identify the contrast set of potential trajectories, they also define that set. And in analytical mechanics they are treated as independent, both of actual magnitudes of microquantities and of the principles of contrast that constitute the dynamical laws. (They are usually ascertained by macroscopic inspections or imposed through macro manipulation.) According to analytical mechanics, therefore, macroscopic structureswhether imposed externally or simply known to hold-are treated as limitations on the total number of dynamical micropossibilities, as it were, from "above".
Thus the Neohamiltonian treatment fails to introduce quantities, such as forces, that mediate between the actual and the possible, and thereby permits violation of the doctrine that once magnitudes of microquantities receive assignment nothing remains unconstrained. And having thus violated the letter of supervenience, it proceeds to violate its spirit as well, by explicitly permitting macroquantities to function in the capacity of degrees of freedom. (In this way the Neohamiltonian treatment also violates an asymmetrical notion of dependence between micro and macro, according to which the only degrees of freedom are micro in character.) For it is one thing to recognize macroquantities as relations among microquantities, and it is something else entirely to acknowledge that these same relations precede in ontology the magnitudes of the relata. Analytical dynamics regards boundary conditions as (1) independent of dynamical law and (2) prior to it in ontology-since analytical dynamics must treat boundary conditions as prior to variational principles.
Thus mechanics may be so formulated as to permit utilization of dynamical law in order to prevent violations of supervenience: this is Newtonian mechanics. On the other hand, mechanics may be so formulated as to allow violations of supervenience for the sake of preserving the dynamical law: this is analytical mechanics. The Newtonian conception guarantees covariation of macroquantities with microquantities, by widening the compass of the latter and exploiting the determinism present in Newton's Second Law. This maneuver brings down the total number of micro degrees of freedom from the initial number of theoretically possible 6n to a smaller number of initial quantities. A number of initial microconditions equal to the total number of actual degrees of freedom must, therefore, be specified before a trajectory may be computed. (In fact, an extraordinary number of initial conditions, larger than the number of degrees of freedom, are required to compute a trajectory.
Many of these are initial magnitudes of the force fields, which are not, interestingly, regarded as degrees of freedom. Forces are regarded as essential characteristics of a substance, that depend in part on "constants" of the system like the masses and charges of the component particles. The magnitudes of forces themselves are said to supervene on magnitudes of these constants plus the magnitudes of universal constants, like that of universal gravitation. To take an example, the forces by which a body of steel retains its integrity are considered essential to steel: steel would not be steel minus these forces. There is, therefore, a kind of essentialism implicit in the Newtonian conception of system, which the Neohamiltonian conception lacks. The latter is thus incapable of preserving supervenience. There is in this regard, therefore, a connection between essentialism and supervenience, which I shall not explore here further.)
The Neohamiltonian conception too guarantees selection of a unique trajectory among those not initially prohibited. But it cannot exploit a capacity (via variational principles) for determining subsequent magnitudes of microcoordinates, for the sake of conferring magnitudes on macroquantities. Instead macroquantities are seen as serving as degrees of freedom, so fewer microquantities are required to serve in that capacity. The price of all this, of course, is violation of supervenience.
Thus of the two treatments here considered, only the Neohamiltonian treatment necessitates abandonment of reductionism. As would be expected, reductionism is given up when independence is conferred on macroscopic quantities. But determinism is not compromised thereby. Thus, provided no third alternative emerges, a mechanics that aspires to be comprehensive must either (1) shun supervenience, or (2) commit to the existence of (forwardlooking) quantities, like forces, whose magnitudes mediate between micro and macroquantities-and that these shall be quantities whose magnitudes can never themselves be measured, but instead must be calculated with the aid of something like Newton's Second Law. We have therefore uncovered an important relationship among determinism, supervenience and the doctrine of causes-a three-sided relationship which we shall not explore further here.
Thus it is possible-in cases customarily treated under the umbrella of classical mechanics-to call on determinism to prevent violations of supervenience. Alternatively, a theory may exploit violations of supervenience for the sake of determinism, without calling on such things as forces (or essences). And where there is the capacity to move freely between two such formulations, it is impossible to make clear remarks on the status of either doctrine-supervenience or determinism-without remarking on usages of the other. The two threads are intertwined.
In the Newtonian portrait only actual magnitudes of microquantities receive portrayal. And magnitudes of both forces and macroquantities are said to be founded on them. Merely potential magnitudes of microquantities do not inhere in anything. (It is strange, and an expression of the pioneer's peculiar stern-heartedness toward the merely potential, to proclaim that actual magnitudes are properties of an actual body, but that potential magnitudes, if they are properties of an actual body, are second-rate or derivative propertiespotential magnitudes are "properties-in-law" rather than properties in the more innocent sense of the term.) In the Neohamiltonian treatment, actual and potential take equal parts in portraying physical systems. Potential trajectories are determined by a combination of constraints, macromanipulations and confinements, which themselves do not receive treatment via dynamical laws. Identification of boundary conditions with various macrofeatures of the system-in-itself suggests that the Neohamiltonian conception of system is "contextual". By this I mean it is inappropriate to request characterization of a physical system taken "in isolation", if by that is meant "without specification of boundary conditions". For, on the conception of system that emerges here, there is no such entity as this system in splendid isolation-if this system is not already in splendid isolation. 28 Examinations thus far have revealed no reason to doubt the existence of a unique answer to the question: How many degrees of freedom are there? But is there any sense in asking: Which are the true degrees of freedom in the universe? Personal bias, or dictates of a venerated figure or tradition, rather than evidence, may be permitted to guide selection of one rather than another set of quantities as independent-if more than one set will fit with observation. (After all, we cannot nakedly observe that certain quantities are degrees of freedom.) And since it may be possible to pass freely from one formulation of mechanics, in which one set of quantities is marked as independent, to the other, in which a different set is marked as independent, using Newton's Second Law for example, is there any sense in choosing at all, let alone looking to the world for guidance? Are disagreements on degrees of freedom, then, matters of convention, with nothing to choose between them for the empirically minded, in much the same way that spatial coordination is a matter of convention? No. I will argue that these disagreements can be parlayed into disagreement about what observation shall yield.
Supervenience is a contingent matter
Consider a measurable, and to all appearances macroscopic, characteristic C of a body which is otherwise a black box to us except for its spatial positions and momenta at different points in time. Let these positions and momenta be 28 Lanczos [21, 4] puts it this way: "The analytical approach to the problem of motion is quite different [from the Newtonian approach]. The particle is no longer an isolated unit but part of a 'system.' A 'mechanical system' signifies an assembly of particles which interact with each other. The single particle has no significance; it is the system as a whole which counts." collectively designated by 'B'. Assume that magnitudes of the quantity C can be ascertained by a variety of different measurement procedures, and these procedures yield comparable results in the same cases, so that we may be satisfied there is indeed a real quantity manifesting itself in the different episodes of measurement. Prior to formulating a theory concerning the relation of C to other quantities in the collection B, and prior to inquiry into how the body interacts with its environment, we may (without bias) take C to be a potential degree of freedom. Of course we may employ the doctrine of supervenience in the service of heuristic or strategy: in our initial efforts, we may seek to preserve supervenience by proposing theories which describe C as instantaneously functionally dependent on (some subset of) B. At the conclusion of our inquiry one of three things will have happened: (1) we will have achieved the goal of declaring C an instantaneous function of some subset of B; (2) we will not have achieved that goal, but will have instead discovered a scheme for interrelating the magnitudes of C and B, which takes notice of noninstantaneous magnitudes of a subset of B; (3) we will have found no covariation scheme of any kind in which C and B together enter.
Suppose (2) is the outcome of our treatment. Naturally, the difference between (1) and (2) does not mark the difference between discovery of a necessary truth and discovery of a contingent one, for nothing prevents a discovery made under the description (2) being taken as necessary-as an identity or constitution statement of some kind. This, of course, will be the position preferred by friends of supervenience.29 Interestingly, however, if (3) should turn out to be the case, we will then consider the supervenience proposal contingent. We will confer on it the metaphysical status we confer on the proposal that the dimensions of all trees are functionally dependent on the dimensions of a certain special tree.3" Thus it is only when we recognize (3) as a possible outcome of our enterprise that we recognize our enterprise as an "empirical" one. But what prevents us always being open to (3) as a possible outcome? The predisposition to supervenience, naturally.
The argument of the previous paragraph does not, of course, show that we must be open to the possibility of (3) in any given instance. But we should, I claim, be open to the possibility of (3) in every instance in which C is not explicitly defined in terms of microquantities, and thus is not computed on the basis of determinations of magnitudes of those quantities (in other words, instances in which we have independent access to the magnitudes of C without going through computations involving microquantities). 29 As long as they maintain the judgment that C is a macroquantity, and do not suddenly change to judging it a microquantity. 30 The argument I will use against taking the supervenience proposal as necessarily true will be just as effective against taking it as necessarily false, so I will not consider that possibility here.
The primary reason, I believe, for recognizing (3) as a possibility in these important instances is that we ought to be suspicious of a real demarcation in nature between microscopic and macroscopic. The distinction is untidy, however useful: it does not admit of a human-purpose-independent boundary. This being so, we should be prepared to acknowledge that no ontological priorities or privileges go with being microscopic. But even if we suppose there is a human-purposes-independent reality corresponding to the distinction between micro and macro, there is still a compelling reason to acknowledge the possibility of (3) in the cases I have called to attention. The reason is that supervenience is a contingent proposition, which entails other contingent propositions.
A story offailures
The discipline of thermodynamics provides perhaps the best examples of how we may err when dismissing (3) as a possible outcome of empirical investigations. In thermodynamics we have the celebrated questions pertaining to the relations in which the quantities of temperature, heat and entropy stand to positions and momenta (microquantities) of microbodies. The dispute is still waged (for example) as to whether temperature is an instantaneous function (the mean) of certain functions of microcoordinates. 31 In thermodynamics, equilibrium is defined as that condition of a system in which a small number of thermodynamic quantities-primary among them temperature-remain unaltered indefinitely into the system's future. Classical thermodynamic theory maintains that certain systems, like cylinders full of gas and beakers full of liquid, when prevented from exchanging energy with environment, approach this equilibrium state monotonically, and that once there do not depart from this state. The famous Second Law of Thermodynamics states that the entropy of an energetically isolated system tends to a maximum, which is realized in the equilibrium state. Initially taking the Second Law at face value, Ludwig Boltzmann attempted to derive something with a similar structure from a somewhat truncated force-mechanical theory, taking point particles as models of the smallest units of substance, and elastic billiard-like collisions as models of the interactions between these units. He defined a function of the instantaneous distribution of momenta: the negative H-function. This function, he was able to show, based on his assumptions about the number and results of collisions among billiard-like entities that served as his models, increases monotonically until the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution of momenta is reached, and thereafter remains constant.
Two famous, and related, objections were raised to Boltzmann' s account of the approach to equilibrium. They are the substance of the persistent and ageold problem of irreversibility. I will focus on the objection associated with 31 See, for example Brush [5] and Wilson (40] . the name of Zermelo, which is based on a theorem of Poincare concerning the stability of motion in systems assumed to be governed by classical mechanical laws.32 Adopting a single-trajectory model of mechanical system, Poincare's showed that every energetically isolated mechanical system with spatially bounded motion will behave quasi-periodically. In other words, a system such as an insulated box of particles may pass through a great range of states depicted in phase space, but will eventually return arbitrarily close to its initial state. This is known as the Recurrence Theorem. Thus any enclosed volume of gas, if governed by mechanical laws, will continue to return arbitrarily close to the distribution of positions and momenta with which it began life, given enough time. So if, as Boltzmann initially defined it, the Hfunction is a function of the actual distribution (and thus a function of quantities on a single trajectory in phase space), it cannot decrease monotonically and remain at a minimum-at least not if the system is governed by force mechanics of the sort Boltzmann envisioned. Since the H-function cannot behave as Boltzmann claims, it cannot represent entropy.33 The H-theorem therefore cannot be considered the mechanical analog of the phenomenological Second Law of Thermodynamics, which concerns the monotonic approach to an equilibrium state.
After some time Boltzmann retracted his initial reading of his theorem. In doing so, he also introduced a new interpretation of the Second Law. He came ultimately to understand both in terms of likelihoods. In his ultimate account, there is no asymmetrical, monotonic evolution for thermodynamically isolated systems. The true situation, he said, is as follows: it is overwhelmingly more likely that the entropy of an isolated system in a nonequilibrium state will increase, rather than decrease, in the sequence of states undertaken by that system. This holds whether we are referring to a sequence of states extended into the future or one extended into the past: just as it is overwhelmingly more likely that a state of high entropy will be succeeded by one of lower entropy, it is also vastly more likely that a system in a low state of entropy will have originated from a state of higher entropy than that it will have originated from a state of lower entropy. Boltzmann's ultimate description of thermodynamic phenomena is therefore consistent with the Recurrence Theorem. But not with classical thermodynamics. 32 The notion of "mechanical" employed by Poincar6 is defined in terms of a particular kind of single path in phase space-specifically one definable by the operation of a unitary mapping, with an inverse. Such a path has the characteristic that it never crosses over itself. Thus it respects a certain thesis of determinism. 33 The conclusion normally drawn is that Boltzmann's assumptions cannot all be consistent with the mechanical law assumed by Poincar6. My conclusion will be that the single-trajectory depiction of physical system is itself inadequate as a representation of the quantities we need represented (like entropy). Thus Poincar6's theorem shows far less than we thought.
Boltzmann's ultimate position rejects the strict reading of the Second Law of thermodynamics, on which there is true monotonic development and no mention of likelihoods. Boltzmann's position, however, is unsatisfactory as a reconciliation of classical thermodynamics with classical mechanics: the distinctive relations of quantities revealed in the classical laws of thermodynamics are not preserved by Boltzmann's kinetic theory, or its many successors. More than that, the two conceptions of thermodynamics-Boltzmann's and that of classical theory-are not empirically equivalent. For it is entirely consistent with Boltzmann's understanding of the Second Law that nothing like an enduring equilibrium state ever emerges in an isolated system; but such a thing is not consistent with classical thermodynamics. Thus, while it might be the case that both the classical understanding of the Second Law and Boltzmann's-which underlies the understandings of many thermodynamicists today-are equally well supported by the existing empirical data (as some, though not myself, might like to believe), the two are not strictly speaking empirically equivalent. Since it is inconsistent with Boltzmann's understanding that a state of true, enduring, equilibrium ever comes into being, those who embrace the physical possibility (much less the actuality) of true states of equilibrium cannot accept Boltzmann's interpretation of the Second Law. 34 If we join this debate on the side of those who favor the hypothesis that temperature and entropy are functions of actual microquantities, then of course we join on the side favoring supervenience of macro upon micro. But we shall do so at the cost of having to suffer as false (possibly necessarily false) the proposition that the temperature of a thermally isolated system takes a monotonic approach to any magnitude, in contradiction of classical thermodynamic theory. For if we affirm supervenience, we shall have to proclaim that temperature is required to cycle or recur. In addition we shall have to affirm the proposition that the Second Law of Thermodynamics-which claims that the entropy of an energetically isolated system approaches a magnitude monotonically-is strictly speaking false as well. But we will not be required to maintain anything of the kind if we reject the supervenience hypothesis as regards temperature and entropy. So supervenience has empirical consequences. And surely whether temperature recurs or not, and whether entropy approaches a maximum monotonically in any given system-these are contingent matters. So supervenience is a contingent matter. 34 Much has been made, in connection with the topic of theory reduction, of the fact that Boltzmann's understanding is incompatible with the classical understanding. But it is not my purpose to discuss the status of the thesis that new theories in physics supersede old ones when (1) the latter are deducible from the former; and (2) the latter have either greater scope or new predictive successes.
A success story, for contrast's sake
Experience, at the same time, teaches that our judgment concerning whether a particular quantity ovaries with positions and momenta is extremely poor. The example of spin is particularly poignant. Spin was originally thought to be entirely dependent upon quantities represented in microcoordinate phase space. In fact it was thought to be an instantaneous function of an angular momentum which could be calculated on the basis of an angular velocity (hence 'spin'). In 1921 Compton wrote: "May I then conclude that the electron itself, spinning like a tiny gyroscope, is probably the ultimate magnetic particle."35 But credit for the contemporary conception of spin, as a degree of freedom independent of microcoordinates, is now given to Goudsmit and Uhlenbeck. Uhlenbeck describes their reasoning as follows:
Goudsmit and myself hit upon this idea by studying a paper of Pauli, in which the famous exclusion principle was formulated and in which, for the first time, four quantum numbers [alongside its spatial coordinates] were ascribed to the electron. This was done rather formally; no concrete picture was connected with it. To us this was a mystery. We were so conversant with the proposition that every quantum number corresponds to a degree of freedom (an independent coordinate), and on the other hand with the idea of a point electron, which obviously had three degrees of freedom only, that we could not place the fourth quantum number. We could understand it only if the electron was assumed [a la Compton] to be a small sphere that could rotate.
After describing a written exchange with Lorentz, he continues:
We could not fully understand [Lorentz], but it was quite clear that the picture of the rotating electron, if taken seriously would give rise to serious difficulties. For one thing, the magnetic energy would be so large that by the equivalence of mass and energy the electron would have a larger mass than the proton, or, if one sticks to the known mass, the electron would be bigger than the whole atom! In any case, it seemed to be nonsense. Goudsmit and myself both felt that it might be better for the present not to publish anything; but when we said this to Ehrenfest, he answered: "I have already sent your letter in long ago; you are both young enough to allow yourselves some foolishness!" (from [ usual microquantities recognized by classical mechanics cannot be maintained. And spin-according to the instruction of these same physicists-is relatively "macroscopic": it cannot be attributed to any subportion of the body to which it belongs, unlike the traditional microquantities-position and momentum-each of which may be analyzed further and still further in terms of positions and momenta, respectively, of subcomponents of the bodies to which they are attributed (in the event those bodies should have subcomponents).
Recognizing (3) as a possibility in instances where independent access exists amounts effectively to abandoning supervenience as a universal doctrine. This is the only means of insuring that mechanical theory can be extended to treatment of any physical phenomenon that presents itself.
On the significance of examples
The first of our case studies demonstrates that the question of supervenience as regards a given macroscopic quantity may be a contingent one, and that presupposing supervenience in such a circumstance may commit the one who presupposes to (false) empirical propositions. So a given supervenience thesis is subject to empirical testing. The second case study illustrates the scientific importance of breaking with the presumption in favor of supervenience. But these results do not settle the question whether supervenience of macro on micro is in fact true. That will depend on what the examples shall dictate. And this topic-which ultimately concerns whether analytical mechanics is superior to Newtonian mechanics-is one that goes considerably beyond the scope of this (already lengthy) essay.36
The prospects of unification in science
If the doctrine of supervenience of macro on micro were true, then we might, in the possibility thereby carved out for theory reduction, anticipate unification of the sciences. But the avenue from reduction to unification is not the only pathway to that destination. We recognize unification as a possibility also when we embrace the proposition that the so-called "lowest" order of phenomena-the microphysical order-is not closed to action "from above". That is to say, when we embrace the teaching that no complete theory of microphysical matters can go without taking notice of the macroas such. Hence that there can be no complete theory without treatment of the so-called "higher orders". This opens the (attractive) possibility that attention to the dynamic relations between the "orders" will ultimately lead to a grand unified theory, in which all scientific domains are treated. This is precisely the position on unification for which my arguments here make room. But 36 Even so, I have no doubt already betrayed where my allegiances lie, although I will be the first to confess that I have not argued for them. this alternative route to unification is strongly opposed in many quarters, amongst those who adhere to doctrines on the stratification of scientific disciplines, as well as amongst those who adhere to the autonomy of special sciences. Here is a prominent statement-quite recent-of a stratificationism amongst the physical sciences themselves:
Statistical mechanics is a theory constructed on the presupposition that systems can legitimately be described by an underlying causal picture of the world. Here, the constitution of the system as a structure built up of micro-constituents, and the lawlike behavior of that structure that follows from the laws governing the micro-constituents and their interaction, constitutes the ground of the supposition that the system as a whole has its behavior governed by the causal structure generated for it out of its constitution.... [I]t is on top of an underlying causal picture of the system that the statistical or probabilistic account of phenomena, essential to the statistical mechanical attempt to account for the thermodynamic features of the world, is superimposed. [32, [148] [149] It is no mean minority that continues to subscribe to the opinion that a theory treating thermodynamic phenomena stands to "pure" mechanics as icing stands to a cake: the one superimposed on the other, with each being independent, and with the microtheory being causally complete-a strange juxtaposition of doctrines which, one would suppose, should suggest the possibility of inconsistency to its framers. The superimposition metaphor is highly influential, and receives expression in the writing of scientists from chemists to psychologists.37 Placing an emphasis on the layering model of the relations among scientific disciplines, as allegedly exemplified also by atomic and thermodynamic physics, this conception of the relation between macroscience and microscience favors continued adherence to the doctrine of supervenience. For the conception is firmly rooted in the idea that there are no degrees of freedom apart from the microscopic.
But since supervenience is a contingent matter, so also is reductionism. And if supervenience should have to be abandoned, reductionism would have to go as well. And for the first time the grounds of its dismissal are reasonably clear. For if it should turn out that microquantities do not exhaust the degrees of freedom in the universe, then we shall have to recognize that macrocoordinates may enter into those laws on which we call to describe regularities at the micro level. If this is true, then we cannot avoid the so-called "downward causation"-though 'causation' is clearly not the best termlooked on with such disfavor (by Kim [12] , for example). However we must acknowledge the possibility of "downward" action-even in mechanics: we acknowledge "downward" action when we say that the rigidity of a certain rod enters into the account of how Reggie Jackson hit one out of the ballpark. 37 The physicist Anderson writes in glowing terms about independent physical sciences. And J. Fodor's [8] autonomist manifesto for the so-called "special sciences" is the mantra in the cognitive sciences.
We must contemplate "downward" action when we contemplate whether the temperature of one body may elevate the quantity of micro motions in another. And we must consider "downward" action whenever we consider whether a mental state (as such) has an irreducible lawlike relation to the magnitudes of microcoordinates of ordinary objects like willows and pillows and pens.
And just as we must recognize reductionism as subject to empirical investigation rather than fiat, we must recognize also that, as the prospects for reduction dim, the prospect of unification are improved. In fact, it will then be recognized that only by falsehood of the thesis that physical independence belongs to microquantities alone, is preserved the truth of the thesis that nonmicroscopic quantities may be physically independent, may enter into regularities of nature, and may star in irreducible descriptions of the universe.
Quantities associated with states of intention may very well enter into these regularities-which regularities are anticipated by some adherents to the doctrine of free will. These free-will promoters argue-quite correctly-that in order for there to be genuine agent-originated action, there must be regularities in nature between an agent's mental states (of intention and belief, for example) and the states of that agent's limbs, as well as regularities between the motions of limbs and the motions of objects with which limbs come in contact; the regularities must exist for the agent to rely on them in the formulation of intentions and so be thought responsible for the action produced. These regularities-if they are indeed regularities-require the truth of some version of determinism which accounts also for mental states. But there is no contradiction here. The contradiction normally felt does indeed hold: it holds between free will and the combination of determinism and supervenience, since this combination proclaims that only initial microquantities serve as degrees of freedom. There is no contradiction, however, between free will and determinism. In other words, free will is not put out of reach by determinism as such; it is put out of reach by reductionism-for the very simple reason that mental states, as such, are not allowed to enter into the ultimate explanation of an event.
Should the possibility be realized that a quantity normally studied by chemists, biologists, psychologists, or even ecologists, enters into regularities with the microquantities of physics-since that possibility cannot be ruled out prior to empirical inquiry38-what then of the twin doctrines of autonomy and hierarchy of the sciences, whose admirers venerate boundaries between disciplines (say physics and biology) artificially drawn by contemporary institutions of research for administrative rather than theoretical purposes? They shall be revealed as delusions. And since it is possible that both 38 Some have made unsupported proclamations to the effect that this possibility can indeed be ruled out. See, for example, Fodor [8] and Lycan [23] . reductionism and autonomy may be false together (by the scenario here depicted, in which the sciences are unified and macroquantities of many varieties are acknowledged as potential degrees of freedom), it is quite clear that they do not together exhaust the logical possibilities on the matter of the relations between microscopic and macroscopic. It is a false dilemma to suppose we must choose between autonomy and reductionism. For the relations between micro and macro are not the simple or straightforward matter philosophers have sometimes made out. The matter deserves serious scientific study, not the legislation to which it has been so far subjected.
